Written by Anwar Alam, Turkish Review. Posted in Columns.

The limits of political Islam: The new AK Party

Over the past decade international consensus began to emerge that Turkey was moving rapidly toward full political democracy. The AK Party and the Gülen movement were credited with bringing, consolidating and expanding the democratic space within the country. Suddenly, in 2013, the ‘Muslim democracy’ AK Party rule had come to be identified with lost momentum and started showing signs of political fatigue.

All the recent moves and responses from the government -- the mishandling of the Gezi protests; the decision to close down, or as the government termed it, “transform,” private university exam preparatory schools (dershane); the threatening of a Taraf journalist who uncovered details of an alleged 2004 “political deal” between the AK Party government and the military to monitor members of faith movements, the movement associated with Fethullah Gülen in particular; the terming of corruption investigations a “conspiracy to destabilize the government” and dismissal of several police chiefs and officers involved -- are signs of a cocktail of political nervousness, fear and arrogance. This has gripped the government and led it to act in desperation, exercising coercive power and displaying apparent disregard for the rule of law.

The unfortunate recent measures and political positioning of the government has jolted Turkey’s democratic credentials and image, strengthened and legitimized the reluctance of the European Union to offer membership to Turkey, and reinforced the widespread misconception that Muslim nations are incapable of institutionalizing democratic rule in general.

One has to understand that this is the same party that rode to political success with a comfortable majority for three consecutive terms since 2002, and that it did so on an agenda of political democratization, civil liberties and economic development. Furthermore, in the past the AK Party demonstrated its political will to achieve these goals by undertaking incremental measures such as de-militarization of the political arena; exposure of the complex face of Turkey’s “deep state” through cases like Ergenekon; provision of increased rights to the Kurdish minority community; and improvement of religious freedoms by ending the headscarf ban in the public sector (excluding the judiciary and military). Added to this was the AK Party’s unparalleled economic track record. How then has it come to pass that this party now seems to be displaying arbitrary exercises of power, a personality-driven authoritarian mode of decision making and a culture of threat and intimidation -- all when there is no credible opposition to the party and its rule?

The popular explanation in both the foreign and domestic media relates to a falling out between the Gülen movement and the AK Party. This narrative had them linked in an informal alliance cooperating on the marginalization of army: With this goal achieved both were left with no choice but to compete in the game of power-politics. In this regard, according to media pundits, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s decision to shut down the prep schools amounted to an “existential threat” to the Gülen movement, leading to retaliation in the form of the current corruption investigations. Such narratives, even if not politically motivated, reflect at best a modern state of mind accustomed to seeing any conflict in terms of power dynamics.

This same modern mind is quick to pick up certain terms such as “parallel state” and “state-within- a-state” and use them liberally to label any organization -- such as the Gülen movement -- without understanding the semantics, context and history of such words. These terms are normally applied to organizations that develop and maintain a secret apparatus with the ultimate objective of capturing state power. How strange then, that media pundits and critics never used these terms in reference to Christian missionary organizations running vast networks of schools and hospitals both within and outside Western countries. Perhaps this is because such missionary movements did not question the secular foundation of the nation-state and certainly did not aim to acquire state power. Such is the certainly the case with the Gülen movement, in whose Islamic imagination the state is essentially a secular entity. However, the “Islamic identity” of the movement is sufficient proof for the same modern mind to associate it with plans for state takeover. Such actions only serve to delegitimize the organization in the public eye, and lend support to illegal and illegitimate actions by the state. However, these sorts of narratives do not hold water for long and quickly expose multiple contradictions:

First, Gülen himself has been accused of supporting the military coup of 1980; if that is true then Gülen personally does not see military as an obstacle to his Islamic vision. This would negate the need for collaboration with the AK Party vis-à-vis marginalization of the military. Second, any serious observer of the Gülen movement would discover that the movement’s focus is the ethical and moral transformation of individual, and has nothing to do with either state/government or state politics. Third, if there is an informal alliance between the two, why then did the AK Party government apparently enter into secret deals with the military back in 2004 to supervise, profile and eventually liquidate the movement at both the individual and organizational level? Fourth, what are the advantages accrued to the Gülen movement due to the supposed informal alliance with the government? Probably none. The movement has never asked for favors from the government, as confirmed by Erdoğan himself: “Why don’t they [the Gülen movement] ask for anything?”

Fifth, the Turkish volunteers of the Gülen movement have voted for the AK Party -- and would perhaps continue do so, given the current political choices in Turkey. This political preference for the AK Party does not imply a programmatic alliance between the Gülen movement and the AK Party unless the latter is a product of the former, which is certainly not the case. The AK Party is an offshoot of Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (RP) and hails from the Islamic political tradition of Milli Görüş (National View) -- albeit distantly. Moreover, the Gülen movement is a strictly non-political, faith-based movement. Finally, if the military power in Turkey has been tamed, curtailed or marginalized, why should this be seen as a consequence of an “informal alliance” between the Gülen movement and the AK Party government rather than that of a gradual democratization process of the Turkish society and state, in sync with a larger global trend?

The democratic deficit currently being witnessed in Turkey is deeply related to the crisis of morality with which the AK Party, its political functionaries and its leadership has been afflicted. What needs to be understood here is that despite coming from the Islamic tradition, the AK Party has never conceived itself as a “moral actor,” rather it sees itself as a “political actor” dedicated to the goal of acquiring state power. As a result, despite an overwhelming public mandate, it still apparently resorted to striking a deal with the (unelected) military in 2004. The panicked response of the government to the publication of these allegations in Taraf is also interesting. Prime Minister Erdoğan himself threatened to punish the journalist in question for making a state secret document public. Legislation like official secrets acts are relics of colonial rule, designed to protect officials from their misdeeds while governing the subject population. The invocation of such legislation by an incumbent Turkish premier, for a nation that had never been colonized, suggests an anti- democratic and authoritarian mindset. One can understand, if not approve of, secret pacts/deals concluded between two sovereign nations, but secret deals between two state organs vis-à-vis that state’s own people certainly contradict the democratic principle of governance that demands transparency in the functioning of all public bodies, particularly the state and government.

The same anti-democratic and authoritarian mindset was reflected in the decision to close the prep schools. No reasonable explanation was provided by the government for this decision. If the government cannot ensure uniformity and standardization of education throughout the country, it has no moral right to put an end to initiatives aimed to promote “equalizing” measures. By providing a high-quality educational service, the Gülen movement is helping many struggling students -- rich or poor -- to be able to compete in the workforce. If the underlying purpose of the government was to finish off the Gülen movement, which according to various estimates owns 25 percent of all prep schools in Turkey, then it would anyway not succeed. The movement has already outgrown this sort of organizational form.

In this display of an authoritarian mindset, the AK Party and its leader Prime Minister Erdoğan are also supported by both the political tradition of political Islam and the political tradition of Turkey. Political Islam, ranging from public recognition of Islam to the creation of an Islamic state and Shariah rule, is all about acquiring state power. Beyond a crude instrumentalization of Islam, the religion’s ethical and moral perspectives cease to be a factor in the country’s governance. It is the preservation of state, not the normative value of Islam, which becomes the end. The AK Party is no exception to this trend. The regime takes preventive measures to ensure its unfettered rule by crushing any opposition -- imaginary or real -- emanating from within the state or civil society.

Turkey’s historical political tradition, in which the state is looked upon as a benevolent father or guardian, personified in a strong individual, also lends its support to and legitimizes the state’s authoritarian tendencies. A nation addicted to hero worship or cult of personality found in Erdoğan just such a leader. As Erdoğan reaches the height of his political career and the state power structure, he is gradually transforming himself into the role of Amir al-Mu’minin (leader of the faithful), becoming AK Party, state, government and nation in one. It is at this stage that what appears to the outside world as authoritarianism becomes a normal, routine exercise of power for him, leading to errors of which he is unaware. One such political blunder is his actions against the Gülen movement -- a movement that in a short span of time has added tremendous soft power to Turkey, facilitated Turkish business globally and spread the Turkish language to many nations. A “political” Erdoğan may triumph temporarily, but a “moral” Gülen will live forever.

Created on 28 January 2014.