Is Secularism the Last Trump Card of Ethnic Politics?

The primary issue being discussed since the July 22 elections has been the realignment of the Kurdish voters. The Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) success in the predominantly Kurdish regions and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party's (DTP) defeat in its strongholds has attracted a great deal of attention.

In examining the motives behind this outcome, analysts have reviewed the influence of Islam in addition to political, social and economic factors.

A large number of analyses, commentaries and interviews recently published in the media have sought to reveal the primary reasons behind the success of the AK Party with particular reference to the influence of religious motivations. Most recently, Aktüel magazine prepared a cover story about the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) allegations against the Fethullah Gülen community. Ece Temelkuran from the Milliyet daily also drew attention to the activities of Islamic groups in the Southeast. The most frequently reviewed groups were the AK Party, the Fethullah Gülen community and Mustazaf-Der, known for its affiliation with Hezbollah. Commentators agreed that the PKK-DTP alliance is losing power, whereas the Islamic groups and the AK Party are enjoying greater support in the region. None of the DTP figures, with the exception of Aysel Tuğluk, has been able to provide a realistic and plausible assessment of the election's outcome. Tuğluk recently made important remarks in an interview published in Yeni Şafak. DTP circles have opted to blame external factors instead of using the election results as an opportunity for self-criticism.

DTP circles maintain that the AK Party and religious groups like the Fethullah Gülen community are seeking to gain control over the Kurdish people with charitable acts. According to this argument, the Kurdish people, who suffer from constant and prevailing poverty, remain ambivalent between adherence to their national identity and their reliance on economic aid. The Islamic groups exploit their despair to promote their agendas.

This same argument points a finger at the Fethullah Gülen community in particular. It is said that the activities of this community in Diyarbakir and other cities in the region attract the attention of desperate and poor families who are concerned about the future of their children. Smart and talented Kurdish children are picked by this community and provided with financial support during their studies. At the same time, their Kurdish identity is deliberately undermined through propaganda.

The argument also goes on to say that some Islamic civil society organizations breed Islamic radicalism and that "mysterious" circles in the state overlook their activities, believing that they balance the impact of the PKK.

In short, deep state actors are said to rely on religion to soothe the people and to repress the Kurdish identity. Through religious propaganda, the Kurds are called to abandon their pursuit of a native language and they are forced to make a choice between religion and language.

The terrorist organization criticizes the religious groups for their activities in the region. It simply describes all other actors as threats that should be destroyed for the effective promotion of the pro-Kurdish agenda. Even leftist-nationalist groups are labeled by the PKK as traitors. Interestingly, those who opt to view the Kurdish question as an issue of terrorism alone do not recognize any group other than the PKK.

State-religion relations in the region

Intelligence agencies throughout the world have often supported relatively weak religious groups for a limited period of time in their struggle against strong enemies. British support for groups seeking independence for Pakistan against India its subsequent indifference to the partitioning of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh is one example of this. Israel's acceptance of Hamas to divide the Arab world for a short time is another. Deep powers in Turkey have frequently relied on this technique in the past. They opted to support religious groups when Communism became popular and Turkish nationalists when the religious groups gained strength. Alpaslan Türkeş, who was held in prison for four years following the military coup in 1980, drew attention to this fact when he said, "We are in prison; yet our ideas are in power."

While people were tortured to death in Diyarbakir's prison after the military coup in 1980, those who staged the coup posted declarations adorned with Quranic verses and sayings of the Prophet on the streets. Whereas secularism was promoted against religious tendencies in the region up until the 1960s, religious groups have been exploited to undermine the impact of leftist-Marxist Kurdish nationalism since the early 1970s. According to a large number of analysts, deep state actors have sought to exploit religious groups to offset the PKK and the parties affiliated with it since the 1990s. However, these groups have had to suffer the greatest injuries, and sex traffickers, loan sharks, drug smugglers and other criminals have enjoyed de facto immunity in the same period. A large number of renowned clerics with significant influence, like Übeydullah Dalar, have been killed. An invisible hand has killed -- or otherwise neutralized -- many Muslim-Kurdish leaders in the region.

PKK-religion relations

While feudal structures constituted the backbone of traditional Kurdish movements, the PKK relies on individuals. The PKK has decided to place its emphasis on secularism. Its most criticized aspect is its excessive emphasis on secularism and its imitation of Kemalist methodology.

Just as Persian culture was promoted during reign of the shah in Iran to delete the imprints of Islam, and as a return to Turkish tribal myths and legends was cited as a replacement for Islam in Turkey, the PKK has promoted Zoroastrianism in an effort to cut the ties between Kurdish people and Islam. This sort of policy is actually similar to the actions of single-party regimes in Turkey, Iran and the Arab world. Of course, despite its known and strong opposition to Islam, the PKK occasionally seeks to benefit from its appeal among the Kurds to promote its agenda.

The PKK presents Islam as a cultural reality rather than a lifestyle and a divine order. The separatist organization has adopted a policy of respect for the beliefs of the people in response to allegations that it is anti-Islam. To this end, it founded the Kurdistan Union of Religious People in Germany in the mid-1990s, followed by establishment of Kurdistan Union of Alevis and Union of Yezidis.

Is religion the opiate of the people?

Reviewing the historical evolution of Christianity in the West, Karl Marx famously wrote that religion is the "opiate of the people." An African writer who wrote about the imperialists in Africa stressed how the imperialists used religion as a means of exploitation, saying: "When the Westerners first arrived, they had crosses around their necks and we had gold pendants. When they left, they had the gold pendants and we were left with the crosses."

Of course, Islam cannot be an opiate. Islam is justice and the rule of law. Islam is faith and ethics. It is the enemy of the persecutor and the friend of desperate. Countless Quranic verses and sayings of the Prophet emphasize this character of mercy and compassion. Throughout Islamic history, different communities, nations, groups and other collectivities enjoyed freedom under Islamic rule. However, some of the Islamic groups in Turkey have ignored the Kurdish question. There are a few important reasons for this negligence, as Ali Bulaç indicated years ago:

The partitioning of the lands of the Ottoman Empire and the separation of Islamic nations along created a fear of division among the Islamic groups. Those who had to leave their native lands in the Balkans and the Caucasus are particularly worried by the threat of division.

The transfer of the caliphate from Egypt to Istanbul in 1517 created a sense of leadership among the Turks. Since then, the sense of Islamic community was replaced by an understanding based on an amalgam of nationalism and Islamism.

Because the leaders making political demands in regards to Kurdish identity in the last four decades have been Marxists and, thus, strongly opposed to religion, the Islamic groups remained distant on the Kurdish question. Pro-Kurdish sentiment has been dismissed by these groups because it was equated with communism.

Thus, many Islamic groups viewed pro-Kurdish policies and demands as racist and deviant. However, they should have recalled this verse from the Quran, "And one of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your tongues and colors; most surely there are signs in this for the learned" (Quran; 30:22). If they had done so, the problem would not have been so complicated. It is not possible to legitimize Turkish nationalism for Muslims while opposing pro-Kurdish tendencies on the grounds that they are contrary to Islamic precepts. 

Tweet

Whatsapp