The Abant Platform and the Kurdish Question
After a couple of weeks in Beirut which allowed me to follow the dynamics of the Middle East much closer, I spent a few days in Turkey and attended the Abant Platform on the Kurdish question. The conference presented a great opportunity to discuss the historical background and current dilemmas in Turkey's Kurdish predicament. Since the current dynamics are well know and widely covered, I will focus on the historical background, as it was discussed in the conference.
The Kurdish question was not a "problem" during the Ottoman times, mainly because Turkish nationalism was not official policy. The ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire proved reluctant to assume and promote Turkish nationalism as long as there was an imperial domain to protect and govern. As a result, Turkish nationalism was late to arrive on the scene. The Union and Progress Party (1908-1918) realized that after the loss of the Balkans in 1912 there was no other option for the ruling elite than to adopt a "Turkish" national agenda. The ethnic dimension of the Kurdish problem emerged during this painful transition from the multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the Ottoman Empire to the nation-building context of the Turkish Republic. Once the Turkish nation-building project came to be adopted by the Young Turks — and later their Kemalist followers — policies aimed at centralization, assimilation and secularism became official.
One also needs to identify two crucial additional factors that characterized the modus vivendi between the Ottoman Empire and Kurdish provinces during the 19th century; namely, the Islamic caliphate and the presence of a common enemy that united Turks and Kurds. The social, cultural and political context between İstanbul and Kurdish provinces had a very strong common denominator: "Sunni officialdom." The presence of the caliphate and the Islamic identity of the Ottoman Empire was a major source of unity. Under Abdülhamid II in particular the symbolism of the caliphate assumed new importance and strengthened the Islamic (particularly Naqshibendi) solidarity between the Kurdish provinces and the imperial center. However, the caliphate was only one dimension of this unity. Throughout the second half of the 19th century there emerged a second factor that boosted the Turkish-Kurdish coalition: the need to confront the common enemy of Armenian nationalism. Sadly, we know all too well how this story ended.
By 1925, when the first Kurdish-Islamic rebellion of Sheikh Said erupted, the factors that united Ottomans and Kurds no longer existed. The caliphate was abolished and a radical plan to implement laicism was in place. Islam was no longer the main common denominator. The Kemalist project aimed to replace the role of religion in society with Turkish nationalism. In the absence of the caliphate, Turks and Kurds could have used their common enemy to unite. Yet, by 1925, the Armenian question was "solved" in a way that created a silent and immoral complicity between Turks and Kurds.
Making things worse, largely in response to the 17 Kurdish rebellions between 1925 and 1938, the Kemalist republic aimed at eradicating the ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity of Kurds. Turkish nation building had an additional dimension of "state building" in Kurdish provinces because Kurdish provinces has no experience with centralized taxation and military conscription during the Ottoman centuries. Under the Ottomans, Kurdish provinces were largely semi-autonomous. Landowners, tribal leaders and feudal lords seldom paid taxes to İstanbul. In the absence of taxation and conscription, the Ottoman state structure was also largely absent in these Kurdish provinces. This is why Ankara needed to first establish the presence of a centralized state structure in southeastern Anatolia. You cannot build a nation without the state apparatus. This is why Turkish nation building in Kurdish provinces required, above all, the assertion of the state. All these factors and new dynamics amounted to a major economic, cultural and political shock for Kurds. They were now facing a secular, national and centralized Turkish state that was determined to assimilate them accordingly. The shock was exacerbated by the fact that most Kurdish feudal landlords had supported the Anatolian War of Independence because Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had promised to save the caliphate and the sultanate from the occupation of infidels. No wonder Kurds were deeply traumatized when Atatürk abolished the very institutions he said he would protect. Add to this assimilation, taxation and secularism under the new Kemalist regime and you can understand how the Kurdish provinces reacted. In their view, they had legitimate reasons to defy authority. From Sheikh Said in 1925 to the Ağri rebellion in 1938, this is exactly what happened. Yet, strangely all we remember from this era in our official textbooks is that these Kurdish rebellions were instigated by "British forces" determined to weaken the Turkish Republic. No wonder today we also blame the Americans for having plans to divide Turkey. Certain things never change.
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